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AN INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM FOR EMERGING
ECONOMIES, TAX SPARING, AND DEVELOPMENT: IT IS
ALL ABOUT SOURCE!
WILLIAM B. BARKER*
ABSTRACT

This Article proposes a source tax system for emerging
economies that promotes development by encouraging the
importation of capital and technologies while at the same time
providing tax revenue for development. Since freer trade and freer
factor mobility have made the traditional territorial notion of
source taxation obsolete, emerging economies should recognize
that source taxation must instead be based on the economic
contribution of the developing economy to the earning of the
income. Consequently, the source of the normal return from
imported capital in all of its forms (money, tangible assets and
intangible assets) is not where it is used but where it was created.
Therefore, the appropriate territorial tax base is locational
economic rents. This solution can be implemented with an
expenditure or cash flow tax that could be imposed in two stages:
one on corporate rents and the second when those rents are
distributed to shareholders. Developed economies should adopt a
tax sparing regime that exempts or allows a deemed foreign tax
credit for the portion of their resident taxpayers' foreign income
that represents locational economic rents. Though the immediate
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gains to both emerging and developed economies will be greatest
if the countries undertake their concessions as part of bilateral
treaties, significant gains can be achieved through unilateral action.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Economic forces unleashed by freer trade and the enhanced
mobility of many of the factors of production have led to intense
tax competition among developed and developing economies
alike. Emerging market economies are particularly susceptible to
the sirens of tax competition due to their even greater need for the
benefits provided by foreign business enterprises. Though the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") have amply
illustrated the economic harm to emerging economies occasioned
by tax subsidies, most economies appear compelled to continue
their use.'
Consequently, many developing countries are
substantially reducing their taxation of foreign business enterprises
operating in their states through tax holidays, preferences and
incentives. In addition, many nations both in the developed and
developing world have added tax preferences and incentives to
attract highly mobile business income. 2 - Finally, tax competition
has forced the tax systems of the developed world to provide
incentives to their own resident enterprises that invest elsewhere.
If a nation desires to attract foreign capital and business
enterprises, it should first examine whether the traditional
territorial notion of source, that was formulated in the 1920s 3 in
1 See generally G.A. MCKENZIE, DAVID W.H. OSMOND & G. PHILLIP GEARSON,
THE COMPOSITION OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND GROWTH,

LESSONS FROM FISCAL

REFORMS IN EIGHT ECONOMIES 8 (1997 IMF Occasional Paper 149); ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES No. 4, CORPORATE TAX
INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 84-85 (2001) (explaining why
countries have become reluctant to grant tax sparing in treaties); ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION 12-13 (1998) [hereinafter
TAX SPARING] (explaining why countries have become reluctant to grant tax

sparing in treaties).
2 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) [hereinafter HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION] (describing the development of harmful tax competition between
states).
3 See generally William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax
Competition: Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 161, 182-83
(2002) (describing the historical development of source taxation); Michael J.
Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "OriginalIntent" of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 46
DUKE L.J. 1021, 1023 (1997) (explaining the importance of the League of Nations'
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relation to a quite different economic order, supports this objective.
This Article argues that freer trade and freer factor mobility have
made this approach obsolete and that emerging economies should
recognize that source taxation must instead be based on a more
realistic economic connection of the income to the state. The
normal return from imported capital in all of its forms (money,
tangible assets, and intangible assets) is appropriately sourced not
where it is used but where it was created. This is the place of
residence of the foreign enterprise-that is, the home country.
Consequently, the appropriate source tax base for the host
country-that is, the country where the business activity takes
place- is locational economic rents.
Thus, this proposal presents a workable strategy for both
developed and emerging market economies that will encourage
foreign direct investment in economies while reducing the
wasteful consequences of tax competition. This strategy will
provide a more certain source of tax revenue to emerging
economies that can be used for general welfare programs while
promoting economically efficient tax relief for foreign business.
Finally, it will provide the appropriate base from a truly
international perspective for resident taxation of foreign source
income.
2.

THE INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL TERRITORIAL TAXATION:
How HAS THIS COME ABOUT?

The world economy today is moving rapidly toward greater
economic integration among nations due to the elimination of
many barriers to the international movements of capital and trade. 4
Free trade is primarily a policy of the developed world that has
more or less established open borders to much of the world's
products and services. Presently, however, major asymmetries
have been created between developed and emerging economies
because in many cases emerging economies have not reciprocated
by granting equal access to their markets.
The developed world also emphasizes open capital markets,
allowing for the free movement of monied capital internationally.
1928 model bilateral income tax treaties); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of
International Taxation: A Proposalfor Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996)
(explaining the 1920s movement to avoid international double taxation).
4 See, e.g., Barker, supra note 3, at 162-65 (examining the factors that
contribute to increased international economic integration).
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Capital in the form of physical assets and technologies also is
largely free to move across national borders. Thus, many of the
factors of production are quite mobile today.
The combination of freer trade and freer factor mobility has
permitted multinational enterprises ("MNEs") of developed
economies to relocate production of goods and services outside of
their home countries while maintaining full access to their
extensive markets and those of other developed countries.
Consequently, locational decisions with regard to production for
worldwide markets present many options for MNEs.
Freer trade and freer factor mobility have created considerable
opportunities for emerging economies as well. Their principle
advantage over the developed world-reduced costs-can be
captured by MNEs. They also offer valuable material and human
resources.
Additionally, due to a lack of reciprocity, many
countries maintain control over import access to their domestic
markets, which in the case of many emerging economies,
represents a principal reason for an MNE's presence.
2.1. The Role of Taxes: The InternationalTax Environment and the
Competitiveness of MultinationalEnterprises
Tax plays an important role in reinforcing the world economic
order fostered by the developed world. In particular, both the
residence and source international tax systems provide substantial
relief for income derived from offshore production of goods and
services.
There are two systems adopted in the world today for the
treatment of the foreign income of resident taxpayers.5 The first
and oldest system is the exemption system that recognizes only
one basis for taxation-the source of the income. 6 Source is
strongly associated with the physical presence of the income or an
aspect of the transaction producing the income within the territory
of the state. The exemption system automatically provides the
theoretical solution for eliminating international double taxation of

5 See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCrURAL ANALYSIS 346, 349, 372 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the source and

residence taxation systems); Barker, supra note 3, at 180-84 (describing the
widespread use of source and residence taxation as the two fundamental systems
for taxing international transactions).
6 See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 372 (describing the exemption system,
using France as an example).
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income by assigning income to only one jurisdiction. In practice,
however, there is considerable conflict between nations due to the
7
multiplicity of sourcing rules.
The second system is residence taxation, the system adopted in
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 8 which taxes
the worldwide income of residents of a country. The resident
system necessarily conflicts with territorial taxation. Fairness to
taxpayers dictates that double taxation by more than one nation
should be eliminated. The world consensus reached many years
ago requires the home nation to adopt an approach to the
elimination of double taxation. This is founded on the general
principle that residence should defer to the primacy of source
jurisdiction. In order to accomplish this, the home country could
allow a tax credit for foreign taxes paid or a deduction for foreign
taxes paid. The international norm is to allow a foreign tax credit.9
These two systems have vastly different approaches and
underlying philosophies. The equity of worldwide taxation is that
all residents should pay the same tax no matter where their income
is earned. The equity of the exemption system is that each nation
should have the exclusive right to tax income arising within its
borders.
This profound theoretical distinction is largely an illusion,
however. Exemption systems do begin with a large competitive
advantage for resident businesses with foreign operations.
Exemption systems theoretically ensure that residents' activities
are carried out on a "level playing field" in the foreign country.
Yet the perceived necessity as seen by worldwide countries to
empower their residents to be competitive in foreign undertakings
undermines the general principle of worldwide taxation in that
operations undertaken by residents through foreign enterprises are
tax-deferred. Under a residence-based system like the one used in
the United States, as long as home country MNEs use the form of
foreign corporations to carry out their activities, income is deferred
7 See Barker, supra note 3, at 202-12 (explaining the difficulties in defining
source).
8 See William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the
United Kingdom and the United States, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 16-17 (1996) (exploring
the origins of income taxation in the United States and the United Kingdom).
9 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (2003) [hereinafter OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION]
(providing a model to clarify taxation of taxpayers engaged in international
activities).
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until repatriated and, upon repatriation of the profits, the
enterprise is still entitled to a credit for foreign taxes previously
paid. 10 This treatment is equivalent to an interest-free loan to the
MNE of the residual home tax due.1 In both foreign tax credit and
exemption systems, the benefit is maximized the longer the tax
deferred or tax saved remains outside the home's taxing
jurisdiction since the investment return from that savings is
deferred or exempt.
When generally contrasting foreign tax credit systems with a
pure exemption system, it is apparent that the taxpayer is treated
more favorably under an exemption system than under a deferral
system. There are many elements in foreign tax credit systems that
have the power to equalize the scales of competition, however. In
foreign tax credit systems, the taxpayer usually can average the
income and taxes paid in all foreign jurisdictions (known as the
overall foreign tax credit limit) with the outcome that where the
MNE is engaged in business in high tax jurisdictions (those with
greater taxes than the home country), the MNE may be in an excess
credit position eliminating any residual tax on income earned in
low tax jurisdictions like emerging economies offering tax
incentives. The present system, in which emerging economies
grant tax benefits to MNEs, may be characterized as foreign aid to
developed economies since the developing economies are
subsidizing the activities of MNEs in highly taxed developed
economies. Since there is no residual tax, the result of an excess
credit position is theoretically the same as that of an exemption
system. Though an MNE in an excess limit position (where its
creditable taxes are less than its home country tax liability) is not
effectively exempt, it does receive the benefit of deferral. One
extremely effective strategy for firms with an excess limit12 for
increasing the amount deferred that is not available (at least in the
United States for those with excess credits) is to finance their
investment in tangible assets in low tax jurisdictions with interest
borrowed and sourced in the home country and currently
10 See 26 I.R.C. § 881 (2000) (providing for taxation of foreign corporations
unconnected to U.S. businesses); I.R.C. § 902 (2000) (providing for indirect foreign
tax credit for dividends paid by foreign corporations).
11 Wilson E. Schmidt, U.S. Capital Export Policy: Backdoor Mercantilism, INT'L
TAX AND PuB. FIN. xx, 34 (1975). The residual tax is the tax due the home country
after the application of the foreign tax credit.
12 This strategy may also be available for taxpayers residing in exemption
countries.
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deductible against home country income. In the United States, the
tax law allocates a portion of U.S. source interest expense to foreign
sources, thus reducing the foreign tax credit limit.13 Taxpayers in
an excess limit situation are not adversely affected by this
provision.
The trend toward convergence is not one-sided, however.
Though some capital exporting nations began with a pure
exemption method for eliminating double taxation, they too are
gravitating in the other direction toward residence-based taxation.
As "exemption" nations abandoned currency control and became
capital-exporting nations, and as tax competition for capital and
business heightened, developed economies recognized the critical
nature of international tax principles and the importance of
adopting at least some principles of residence-based international
taxation. Consequently, the detrimental impact of tax competition
has been largely analyzed and addressed from the perspective of
the developed economies. 14 A primary emphasis was placed upon
taxation of residents' foreign source capital income. Today, there
are few developed countries that exempt residents' foreign source
portfolio income. 15 The closer residence and exemption systems
become, the more important the details of how the deferred or
exempt tax base is defined and calculated in assessing the relative
competitiveness of nations' MNEs become.
In addition to passive income, foreign source business income
has also been targeted by many nations because of the sizable gaps
in source taxation. The general threshold for the source taxation of
business income is that the activity must be carried out through a
permanent establishment in the host.16 Free trade plus this high
13 See 26 I.R.C. § 864(e) (2000) (providing rules for allocating interest); I.R.C. §
904 (2000) (enumerating a limitation on credit).
14 See generally HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 2 (discussing the
harmful effects of tax competition on largely industrialized countries); see also
Barker, supra note 3, at 169-71 (describing initiatives of the European Union and
the OECD to combat harmful tax competition).
15 Though some developed countries historically adopted the principles of
territorial taxation only, today these countries do not exempt all foreign source
income of residents. The typical pattern is to distinguish between active business
income, which is exempt, and portfolio income, which is not. See AULT &
ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 372-75 (explaining the distinction between active
Harry Grubert claims that "[n]o
business income and portfolio income).
industrialized country exempts royalties and interest." Harry Grubert, Comment
on Desai and Hines, "Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global
Setting," 53 NAT'L TAXJ. 263, 264 (2005).
16 See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9, art. 5 (defining "permanent
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threshold for source taxation has allowed MNEs to gain free access
to developed countries' markets without significant taxation of the
income attributable to production undertaken in lower-tax
jurisdictions. Both exemption and residence tax countries have
recognized that they needed to shore up their tax bases if they
were to preserve the integrity of their tax systems. To do this, they
also focused on residence principles and on the role tax havens
play.1 7 Most developed nations have adopted Controlled Foreign
Corporation ("CFC") legislation, which is aimed at ending the
deferral or exemption of certain foreign income.18 Depending on a
nation's approach, CFC legislation targets income that can be
described as passive income (as opposed to active business
income), income earned by conduit enterprises, income from
highly mobile sources, or income earned in low-tax jurisdictions
(where the taxes do not satisfy a home country's minimum
threshold or the countries are included on a prescribed list). 19
Where either deferral or exemption is eliminated under CFC-type
legislation, the value of tax incentives provided by emerging
economies to MNEs is redirected to the home country's treasuries.
Even with CFC legislation, however, the tax advantages of offshore
activities are still large.
Consequently, the definitions and scope of the passive-active
distinction adopted in each country can have a profound effect on
the actual revenue generated by a country, whether a foreign tax
credit or exemption country. Studies have persuasively shown
that in the case of the United States, switching to a dividend
exemption system for the business income of foreign corporations
would dramatically increase the taxes paid by MNEs to the United
States. 20 This would indicate that foreign tax credits earned from
establishment" for purposes of the Model Convention as "a fixed place of
business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried
on").
17 This was the focus of the OECD study, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra
note 2.
18 See 26 I.R.C. § 961 (2000) (stating the U.S. tax provisions on adjustment to
basis of stock in controlled foreign corporations). See generally AULT & ARNOLD,
supra note 5, at 377-86 (describing the limitations various developed countries
have imposed on exemption or deferral of income of foreign corporations).
19 See generally AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 377-86 (discussing income
characterization strategies using country-specific examples).
20 E.g., Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go If We Go
Territorial? Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational
Corporations,54 NAT'L TAX J. 787, 798 (2001) (stating that dividend exemptions will
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active business income offset the tax on foreign passive income. In
exemption-based systems, the non-taxation of foreign business
capital income can have a similar effect. This income, however,
does not always end up increasing the tax base of emerging
economies even where their tax rates are low. MNEs are adept at
using tax haven regimes to relocate income or to translate income
from otherwise passive sources into exempt or deferred active
business income. 21 The effect of these home country actions is a
direct subsidy to its MNEs. Indeed, all of these tax saving factors
can be amplified by self-help transfer pricing devices that shift
income to its most advantageous source by overcharging or
22
undercharging for goods, services and capital.
One last feature that reduces the advantage that exemption
systems have over foreign tax credit systems is the impact they
have on corporate dividends in integrated systems. Where income
is exempt at the corporate level, the portion of the dividends paid
to non-corporate shareholders rarely receives the benefit of tax
relief. 23 In a foreign tax credit regime like the United States, there
is no differential treatment of the dividend to non-corporate
24
shareholders according to its source.

likely increase effective tax rates); see also Harry Grubert, Enacting Dividend
Exemption and Tax Revenue, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 811, 811 (2001) (arguing that dividend
exemption will likely raise tax revenue).
21 See, e.g., Katz Fifth Interim report of the Commission of Inquiry into
Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, Basing the South African
Income Tax System on the Source or Residence Principle- Options and
Recommendations
para.
8.1.1.
(March
7,
1997),
available
at
www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/katz/5.pdf [hereinafter Fifth Report]
(noting the ease with which taxpayers can transform passive income into exempt
dividends or defer taxation).
22 Most nations have anti-avoidance provisions to prevent transfer pricing
abuses. See 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006) (providing for the U.S. government's discretion
in allocating income and deductions among businesses owned by the same
interest in order to prevent tax evasion); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 400-35 (2003) (discussing anti-avoidance
provisions in general).
23 See BEN TERRA & PETER WATrEL, EUROPEAN TAX LAW 172-73 (3rd ed. 2001)
(providing that states often impose an equalization tax on profit distributions that
have not already been taxed domestically).
24 The United States is presently a split rate system, taxing dividends like
capital gains at a fifteen percent rate. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006). The U.S.
extends this treatment to the dividends of certain foreign corporations qualified
by treaty and to foreign corporations traded on an established securities market in
the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11)(C) (2006).
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2.2. The Interplay of Developed and Emerging Economies' Tax Systems
Other factors that should be included in the competitive mix
are the treatment by both home and host of charged and selfcharged expenses for overhead, royalties and interest. It is
common practice for host nations to deny branches deductions for
portions of the MNE's expenses for overhead, research and
development, and interest. 25 Obviously, most enterprises will use
separate enterprises in these cases, but it is not unusual that
actually charged expenses will be denied. 26 The denial of these
costs results in a shift of income to the host. This is tax exporting
and dis-incentivizes nonresident business. The deductibility of
these expenses must also be assessed from the perspective of the
home's tax laws. Where the home country allocates these costs to
foreign source income, thus shifting income to domestic sources,
international double taxation is not avoided both in the case of
foreign tax credit and exemption systems. In some cases, however,
where the home effectively permits the home enterprise to treat
these costs as costs deductible against domestic income, the home
nation is complicit in the income shift which clearly understates
home country income and overstates foreign income in the host.27
This latter treatment may even be an intended tax subsidy by home
nations to MNE operations abroad.
Interest plays a critical role in determining the income allocated
to the host. The greater the percentage of debt finance, the smaller
will be the income tax base due to the deductibility of interest.
This interest income is often exempt or lightly taxed when paid to
nonresidents. It is also a common strategy of MNEs to increase the
value of deferral by utilizing earnings to retire debt. 28 Where the
25 See, e.g., AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 401 (observing that countries
generally do not recognize self-charged expenses for payments between Host
branches and Home enterprises). France is one country that does allow the
administrative expenses of a Home enterprise to be allocated to a French branch.
Id. at 402.
26 See Robert J. Patrick, Jr., U.S. Tax Treaties with Developing Countries, in

UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

307, 318-30 (Robert

Hellawel ed., 1980) (describing different international tax regimes). See also Fifth
Report, supra note 21, para. 5.5.5 (describing the UN Tax Model Convention's
denial of deductions for expenses charged to a head office).
27 See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 366 (citing France as a country that
does not require the allocation of an enterprises interest expense between exempt
and nonexempt income).
28 See James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential Consideration,
52 NAT'L TAX J. 385, 400 (1999) (stating that MNEs typically undercapitalize
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finance is provided by the enterprise, this interest often ends up in
tax haven finance subsidiaries. 29 Many countries have enacted thin
capitalization rules which act to classify part of the related-party
debt as equity to prevent this over-reliance on debt.3 0 The policy is
to ensure that a certain amount of the profits are distributed to
shareholders as income from equity capital, which is not
deductible, as opposed to debt capital which is deductible. The
debt-equity problem is often compounded because while nations
still impose some withholding taxes on dividends paid to foreign
persons, more and more nations do not tax interest paid to foreign
persons. In some emerging economies, however, the absence of
thin capitalization rules can be the result of a conscious policy to
31
subsidize a foreign enterprise.
As will be more fully demonstrated below, thin capitalization
rules are a poor choice of remedy because they are out of sync with
an economic approach to the host taxation of both dividends and
of interest. Dividend distributions can represent either the normal
return of shareholders' capital or economic rents. As economic
rents, they are appropriately taxed by hosts. As return on capital,
they should be treated the same as interest. But the income tax
approach to interest that allows a full deduction for the amount
paid (the nominal rate) presents an unjustified result.
Internationally, the accepted treatment of interest accepts the
nominal rate, which includes the real return on capital plus the
return for inflation, as the appropriated deduction from the income
tax base. Under conditions of inflation debtors repay with cheaper
money, thus, the inflationary component of interest does not
represent a real cost. Creditors receive their principal with
diminished value, thus, the inflationary component of interest is
not real income. As a second-best solution, the trade-off between
over-taxed lenders and under-taxed borrowers may be satisfactory

undertakings so that once profitable, they will not have to repatriate these
earnings).
29 See id. at 401 (noting that every year, about half the taxes on income earned
by foreign subsidiaries of American corporations is deferred).
30 See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 5, at 411-14 (describing rules various
countries have implemented to curb debt financing of nonresident-owned
domestic corporations).
31 Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the
Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments, and Multinational Companies,
CESifoWorking Paper No. 1613, 2005, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=875308, at 7.
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where both lenders and borrowers are taxed at the same rates by
the same system, but where borrowers are under-taxed by hosts
and lenders are not taxed by hosts at all, significant distortions
occur that substantially reduce the tax base of hosts. Thus, full
interest deductions represent a substantial subsidy to MNEs by
hosts.
2.3. Developing Economies, Source Taxation, and Tax Sparing
Developed countries, however, often ignore their role as source
countries in promoting tax competition. 32 They can more readily
sacrifice source taxation, bilaterally and unilaterally, because they
have strong residence systems. At the same time, they often have
somewhat effective systems for the taxation of nonresident
business income at least where such business activity requires a
substantial presence in that country. They can even be somewhat
aggressive in taxation because they provide significant markets for
the consumption of the foreign enterprises' products and services.
Emerging economies do not share the same economic factors.
Most rely on territorial taxation and are only slowly adopting
residence principles. 33 This was often because territorial taxation
was the heritage of colonial rule. For example, the English
mandate for its colonies was that only income arising in the
colonies came within the "colonial jurisdiction" to tax. 34 South
Africa, which, as a former British colony, had adopted strict
territorial tax principles, did not adopt the residence principle until
2000 after the overthrow of apartheid. 35 Because most developing
economies have been slow to adopt residence principles, some
have been victimized by the flight of capital of their residents. 36

32 See, e.g., Barker, supra note 3, at 172-73 (noting that significant U.S. tax
incentives adopted in the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 increased the flow of
capital to the United States).
33 See Fifth Report, supra note 21, para. 1.3.4 (stating that Brazil and Argentina
have recently adopted residence-based tax systems).
34 Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Income Tax in the
Colonies Not Possessing Responsible Government, (Dec. 1922), Cmd. 1788, at 5.
See also William B. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote
DemocraticPolicy: The Example of the Move to CapitalGains Taxation in Post-Apartheid
South Africa, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 703, 713-14 (2005) (describing the United
Kingdom's colonial tax policies).
35 Barker, supra note 34, at 714, n.71.
36 See Barker, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing the impact of capital mobility on
the taxation of capital imports).
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Their principle character is that of a capital-importing nation,
however, whose primary tax emphasis is the source taxation of
37
both residents and nonresidents alike.
Thus, emerging economies strongly assert their entitlement to
traditional territorial jurisdiction. 38 In addition, they often assert
that this tax base belongs to them exclusively and that developed
countries should limit residence principles. 39 The assertion is made
that developed countries should either exempt income sourced in
developing countries or provide tax sparing credits. This position
directly conflicts with the trend in developed countries which
pushes for the dominance of residence. 40
Tax sparing is a device used both by countries taxing
worldwide income, which allow a foreign tax credit, as well as
exemption countries, which allow a foreign tax credit for certain
kinds of income (like dividends) that are not exempt.41 The object
is to permit developing economies to reduce their income taxes
under an incentive scheme for foreign taxpayers without having
the residence country collect the spared tax. Thus, developed
countries agree by treaty to permit their resident taxpayers an
additional credit for the amount of tax spared by the developing
country. Where the home country's tax is greater than the actual
plus the spared tax of the host, the home country still receives a
residual tax.
Full exemption systems promote this goal by implicitly
recognizing a nation's exclusive right to source taxation. Tax
sparing, on the other hand, is an exception to resident taxation.
The home country agrees to relinquish its right to the extent that
the source country decides to reduce its normal tax burden to
accomplish important societal goals. Tax sparing is conceived not
as a device for accomplishing inter-nation justice, but rather as a

37 See, e.g., Klaus Vogel Worldwide v. Source Taxation of Income- A Review and
Reevaluation of Arguments (PartII), 16 INTERTAX 310, 311-12 (1988).
38 For a general account of the history of this debate, see M.B. RAO, DOUBLE
TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 98-100 (1983).
39 Developing economies often require tax sparing (or exemption) before they
will enter into treaties with developed economies. See TAX SPARING, supra note 1,
at 19-20.
40 The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2003), for
example, gives much less weight to the source principle than to the residence

principle. OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 9.
41 Examples of the former are the United Kingdom and Japan; examples of
the latter are Germany and France. See TAX SPARING, supra note 1, at 68-69.
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device to aid an emerging economy. Due to the inherent conflict
between source and residence, the sacrifice is not one-sided,
however, for the premise of tax sparing is that the host is giving up
what it is entitled to, so the home will also.
Tax sparing and special home country exemptions for
emerging economies, however, are diametrically opposed to the
purpose behind CFC and other international anti-avoidance
legislation that insists that resident taxpayers should be subject to
tax somewhere. That is why the debate in the developed world as
to the wisdom of tax sparing has proceeded on the general premise
that tax sparing is foreign aid. 42 Advocates assert that developed
nations have a duty to aid developing economies and that they are
not doing enough.
While recognizing the inefficiencies of
providing incentives to MNEs to provide aid to other nations, they
note that until we substantially increase aid, this is better than
43
nothing.
The original objection to tax sparing was that it "violates the
principle of equity in the investor's country since any exemption or
tax sparing violates the principle of taxation in accordance with
ability to pay." 44 Though the United States has considered tax
sparing and other tax incentives for providing aid to emerging
economies over the years, none have ever been adopted. 45 For
42 See generally TAX SPARING, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing world views on
tax sparing). For a recent reexamination of tax sparing, see Paul R. McDaniel, The
U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy
Analysis, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 265 (2003), which examines whether the
United States should amend its international tax rules in ways that might
encourage U.S. companies to invest in developing countries.
43 A strong advocate of this position has been Professor Karen Brown. See,
e.g., Karen B. Brown, Transforming the Unilateralistinto the Internationalist:New Tax
Treaty Policy toward Developing Countries, in TAXING AMERICA 214 (Karen B. Brown
& Marie Louise Fellows eds. 1996); Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S.
International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries, 23 U. PA. J.
INT'L. ECON. L. 45 (2002) (proposing that the United States adopt a network of
treaties with Sub-Saharan Africa that provides a tax exemption from specified
income from African sources).
44 Stanley S. Surrey, InternationalTax Conventions: How They Operateand What
They Accomplish, 23 J.TAX'N 364,366 (1965).
45 For a detailed history of Congressional consideration of tax sparing and
other types of tax aid for emerging economies, see Robert Hellawell, United States
Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries:A CriticalAppraisal, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1393, 1406 (1966) (discussing the use of the federal income tax system to promote
the economic development of the less developed world). The United States-China
Tax Treaty does have a provision that requires the United States to provide tax
sparing to its residents doing business in China if it adopts tax sparing for any
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many years, however, tax sparing was adopted in the tax treaties
between many developed and developing economies because it
was considered a practical way to aid developing economies and it
increased the competitive position of nations' MNEs.46 Today,
however, nations are engaged in a re-evaluation of tax sparing due
to growing doubt as to its efficacy. 47 The perceived problems are
many. In many cases, the countries aided by tax sparing are much
more advanced today and may not need it. Taxpayers have
learned to avoid considerable taxes by shifting residence to treaty
partners. To remedy this, nations have adopted much more
complex and targeted provisions. Indeed, the complexity of tax
sparing has created uncertainty among MNEs as to tax sparing's
value. 48 The most important consideration, however, is the
growing evidence of tax sparing's underlying premise that
emerging economies are being helped by tax sparing is incorrect.
Instead, emerging economies are being harmed because tax
incentives work poorly. The evidence strongly indicates that it
encourages repatriation of earnings, tax competition and a
substantial loss of revenue without appreciably increasing
49
investment.
3.

THE EFFECTS OF TAX COMPETITION AMONG EMERGING
ECONOMIES ON DEVELOPMENT

The basic approach suggested by the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") for developing countries is that they promote
"growth of stocks of physical and human capital or increased
technological development."5 0 Key to sustained development is
the ability of the government to finance or supply the public goods
and services that the private sector does not supply due to market
failure, like investments in health, education, and the public

other country. United States-People's Republic of China Income Tax Convention,
Notes of Exchange, para. 2 (April 30, 1984).
46 TAX SPARING, supra note 1.
47 Id. at 21-30.
48 Id. at 31.
49 Id. A particularly dramatic example of the ineffectiveness of incentives was
the Canadian experience that estimated that it took $1.00 of foregone revenue to
equal $0.80 of new investment in Canada that would not otherwise have been
made. Id. at 26.
50 MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
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infrastructure. 5' Thus, development depends on the dual goals of
increasing capital and increasing tax revenues.
Thus, one principle emphasis for development must be on
raising revenue through taxes. As compared with developed
OECD nations where revenue as a share of Gross Domestic
Product is an unweighted average of 34.3%, the unweighted
average for non-OECD Asian and non-OECD African countries
was 18.9% and 19.7% respectively.5 2 Indeed, many African
53
countries have revenue to GDP ratios of less than 10%.
The IMF message to developing countries is simple. The
observed consequence of emerging economies granting tax
incentives is substantial revenue loss without an appreciable
increase in investment.5 4 Political stability plays a more important
role in encouraging investment than do tax incentives.55 Nations
need to provide an environment that encourages business activity,
which includes a fair and efficient system of laws and increased
infrastructure development. South Africa gleaned this evidence
and adopted this premise for the reform of its tax system after the
56
fall of apartheid.
The IMF findings are supported by other works that conclude
that tax incentives and preferences and tax holidays are ineffective
because they are redundant.5 7 This is so because the investment
would normally have been made anyway except in the case of
marginal investments. Marginal investments that are profitable
only due to tax breaks may be particularly harmful to developing
economies because they increase the costs of government goods
and services without defraying expenses through taxes, and can
utilize host resources without adding appreciably to the local
economy.5 8 In addition, those MNEs resident in countries like the

51

Id. at 4, 5-6.

52

INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY

FUND,

FISCAL

REFORMS

IN

Low

INCOME

COUNTRIES, EXPERIENCE UNDER IMF SUPPORTED PROGRAMS 12 (1998).
53

Id. at 56, 57.

supra note 1, at 8.
Id.
56 Fifth Report, supranote 21, paras. 1.1.2, 2.1.3.
57 See SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 55-56; ALEX EASSON, TAXATION OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT 21 (1999) (citing studies that tax incentives for investment are
relatively ineffective as they rarely determine investor behavior).
58 This has been referred to as capital congestion, where marginal
investments could well overburden limited host resources. See generally John D.
Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?, available at
54 MCKENZIE ET AL.,
55
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United States, which are in an excess limit situation for foreign tax
credit purposes, may not perceive tax holidays as a benefit, despite
the option of deferral. 59 Perceptions, even if inconsistent with
reality, 60 are important because, to be effective, incentives should
get businesses to act differently.
Though these are important observations on the efficiency of
tax incentives, they may not be convincing to developing
economies. The ever-growing data supports the conclusion that
tax incidence has become a more and more important factor for
MNEs in locational decisions, and developing countries respond.
Most studies before the 1990s found that the tax implications of
foreign investment were a relatively minor consideration in most
Foreign Direct Investments ("FDI") decisions. By contrast, studies
since 1990 have indicated that tax is becoming an increasingly
important factor in locational decisions.
Recent quantitative
evidence indicates that investment and financing is quite sensitive
to tax treatment because of the increasing mobility of the factors of
production, which yields a wide range of choices to business
taxpayers. While this is particularly true in the financial services
sector, manufacturing as well has become much more export61
oriented, and correspondingly more sensitive to tax rates.
It also simply makes sense that where incentives are offered by
neighboring countries with similar endowments sought by MNEs,
62
hosts must reciprocate if they wish to remain competitive.
Moreover, when dealing with foreign investment in general, since
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v88y2004i6p1065-1091.html
(discussing
the role of capital tax competition in creating or mitigating inefficiencies in the
private and public sectors).
59 See Eli M. Noam, Commentary, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 26, at 211 (arguing that "tax holidays may reduce the
incentives for investment by U.S. firms").
60 Fewer host taxes, however, may be deferred home country taxes that do
benefit these MNEs. See discussion infra Section 4.
61 Barker, supra note 3, at 198 (footnotes omitted). The OECD also recognizes
that incentives influence behavior. See CORPORATE TAX INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 10.
62 A recent comparative study of the investment patterns of Japan and the
United States indicates that Japanese firms are much more likely to concentrate
FDI in countries with which Japan has tax sparing agreements than are U.S. firms.
James R. Hines, Jr., "Tax Sparing" and Direct Investment in Developing Countries 3-4
(Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6728, 1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6728. It certainly makes sense that in choosing
between alternative locations, the additional profit resulting from a combination
of low taxes and tax sparing could be a powerful inducement.

U. Pa. J. In t'l L.

[Vol. 29:2

investors operate under conditions of asymmetric information (less
in the host than at home), tax incentives that are widely advertised
63
in the literature may be an obvious way of attracting investment.
Thus, developing countries that desire the benefits of foreign
capital, the benefits of increasing employment, and the
technological advancement it brings, are compelled today to grant
concessions to MNEs. This is a fact of modern economic life, and
many developing countries perceive that they are helpless even
though the harm that is being done can be enormous.
Tax competition as it exists today distorts decisionmaking and
results in an inefficient allocation of resources worldwide, but this
is not the sole fault, nor even the primary fault, of emerging
economies. The more important causes are home governments
and MNEs themselves. 64 Home governments normally relinquish
a substantial portion of their potential residence tax base to MNEs
through exemption or deferral of the tax on non-repatriated
earnings. Anecdotal evidence indicates that MNEs aggressively
pursue tax breaks from emerging economies.
MNEs are
individually driven even though they may ultimately lose more by
dramatic reductions in the goods and services provided to them by
nations' governments. 65 The impact, however, on developing
economies can be catastrophic. Taxes obtained from MNEs may
not be sufficient to cover the cost of public goods and services
provided to them by the host government. 66 Prices, especially in
the case of labor, increase, affecting the competitiveness of local
businesses which do not receive the incentives.
These
63 EASSON, supra note 57, at 19. See also Robert Hellawell, supra note 45, at
1421 (discussing the role of tax treaties in encouraging foreign investment).
64 See Rosanne Altshuler & Henry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the
Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments, and Multinational Companies 3 (Soc.
Sci. Res. Network, Working Paper Series No. 1613, 2005), available at
http://www.SSRN.com/abstract=875308 (discussing the role of home countries
and governments attracting foreign investment).
65 Firms benefit from the public inputs, which are the public goods and
services provided to businesses. Firms lose where the foreign taxes on residents
would have been used for public inputs. See Wilson & Wildasin, supra note 58, at
4 (stating that firms benefit from public expenditures such as infrastructure
investment).
66 In general, governments should recover from firms the costs of providing
public goods and services to them. This is called marginal-cost pricing. See id. at
5 (defining marginal-cost pricing as the pricing where "any tax on a unit of
investment equals the cost incurred by the government in providing public goods
and services"); see also Section 5, infra, for a discussion of the role this plays in
setting taxes.
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consequences are accepted by emerging economies based on the
assumption that the benefits of increased employment,
"technology," and skilled labor imports outweigh these
disadvantages.
Unlike the developed countries which control large tax bases
made up of labor income and consumption, emerging economies
rely on smaller bases and typically obtain in revenue a much
smaller percentage of GDP.
By granting preferences and
incentives, emerging economies give up a substantial portion of
their traditional tax base. IMF studies have documented that
widespread tax exemptions have led to low tax ratios which are
major fiscal factors in contributing to fiscal crises in emerging
67
market economies.
4.

THE OUTLINE OF A SOLUTION

There is no way to sugarcoat the realities of tax competition.
Emerging economies cannot expect much help from developed
economies because emerging economies' tax systems contain
numerous gaps and tax arbitrage points that encourage extreme
competition among them. The policies of developed countries are
unlikely to change because the present tax system supports the
present goals of the developed world of open markets for goods,
services, and capital while preserving the competitiveness and
dominance of MNEs. Developed economies, indeed, are also
caught in a trap of tax competition which is, however, largely of
their own making. In addition, the tax systems of developing
economies, as was shown in Section 3, have various elements of
undertaxing and overtaxing at the same time. The incidence of
taxation is unpredictable, leading to significant uncertainty for
investors. This is true even though the existing systems often do
not effectively tax foreign persons and only haphazardly raise
revenue. What emerging economies need to do is understand tax
competition and learn to reduce its harmful aspects. The problem,
simply put, is that emerging economies do not have a model to rely
on that demonstrates the efficient use of their tax systems to
provide the critical ingredients for development, including

67 See Richard Heming, Michael Kell, & Alex Schimmelpfennig, Fiscal
Vulnerability and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies, 104-13 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper 218, 2003) (examining fiscal crises and
responses in Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Brazil).
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increasing and retaining investment and at the same time
increasing tax revenue.
The remainder of this Article will describe such a model and
the case for its adoption. Section 5 will address the economics of
source taxation that will indicate the room in which emerging
economies actually have to maneuver. This entails a reassessment
of the traditional basis of source taxation in light of practicality and
economic entitlement. The solution proposed is for emerging
economies to give up the income taxation of the normal return
from capital, leaving them locational economic rents as the
appropriate tax base for MNEs. An income tax on economic rents
is equivalent to an expenditure or broad-based consumption tax on
corporations. Section 6 deals with the ideal response for the
developed world and suggests that in exchange for the exclusive
base on income from capital, developed countries should be
willing to relinquish their residual tax on foreign source economic
rents through either exemption or a full tax sparing credit, leaving
emerging economies the exclusive right to tax economic rents.
This Section explains, however, why developing economies should
unilaterally adopt this model even if some residence systems fail to
give appropriate relief to foreign activities.
5.

A MODEL FOR SOURCE TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT TAXPAYERS

This Article presents a model for emerging economies that
makes it possible to understand the tax decisions that are open to
them in attracting foreign business to their shores. The model is
the product of principles of economic efficiency, the reality of the
times, and, just possibly, principles of justice. It starts with an
understanding of the roles of residence and source jurisdiction, but
it does not depend on solving the resident tax crisis of developed
countries. The optimal taxation of foreign MNEs is a problem of
source taxation that can be addressed independent of home
country jurisdiction.
5.1. An Economic Approach to Source
The original understanding of source was that of a territorial
concept that placed a transaction or economic activity giving rise to
income within the borders of a country. Thus, a country that
witnessed the income had the power to tax it.68 Where economies
68

See generally Barker, supra note 3, at 181 (stating that source jurisdiction
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were closed and had currency control legislation in effect, as was
generally the case when our present system of international tax
principles was formulated, 69 taxation based on such physical
power was both theoretical and real. It was supported by a policy
favoring emerging economies since source taxation is growthequalizing whereas residence tax is growth-diverging. 70 Source
taxation benefited poorer countries because it assigned a larger
share of the tax base to capital importing countries. Today,
however, physical power is an illusory basis for taxation of foreign
persons since the developed world has adopted the policies of free
trade and free factor mobility. MNEs are free to locate business
outside the developed world and still have complete access to its
markets. This provides MNEs with many choices, and tax
incidence has a major effect on the desirability of those options.
The physical power to tax the income of foreign persons is
meaningless if its use repels the activity it was meant to tax, and it
is ineffective if the foreign person can shift the tax incidence to the
local economy. This is precisely what happens when emerging
economies try to tax nonresidents' capital income. Thus, source as
territorial jurisdiction must be supplanted by source as economic
origin, which requires a more substantial economic tie that
connects the income to the nation.
The economic origin of income 71 is the place that provides the
factors that produce the income. Since many of the factors of
production of foreign-owned enterprises are imported and can be
used in other locations, there must be other factors of production
found in a nation that are sufficient to attract foreign-owned
economic activities. One general category is the public goods and
services provided to the MNEs by host countries. This has led to a

proposes "that a country has a right to tax income that has 'arisen' in [that]
country").
69 See id. (discussing the relationship of the taxpayer to the taxing
jurisdiction).
70 Assaf Razin & Chi-Wa Yuen, Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate
Convergence: Tax Competition v. Coordination,6 INT'L TAx & PUB. FIN. 61, 69 (1999).
71 The first attempt to define the proper allocation of income worldwide was
undertaken by four economists for the League of Nations in 1923. For a
discussion of this effort, see Barker, supra note 3, at 180-84 (discussing proper
allocations in international taxation). The analysis of economic origin herein is
different, however.
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theory that source taxation's primary justification is as a charge for
these benefits - an exchange or cost-benefit principle of taxation. 72
Since firms benefit from public inputs, it makes sense that
emerging economies should charge for the costs of these
government provided benefits. 73 It follows that user charges,
where feasible, are a direct way to charge for those benefits. 74
When speaking of public inputs like infrastructure development,
user charges are rarely feasible. Any charge, however, whether a
user charge or a general tax, is a cost (not a cost savings) borne by
the firm and cannot in itself be an incentive to locate in a
developing country. Moreover, the trouble with taxation in
accordance with public benefits received is that it presumes a
relationship between the value of the benefits received by the
taxpayer and the quantity in the tax base being assessed. There has
never been a clear rationale for relating a tax on income to benefit
received. 75 This is problematic in a closed system, but is delusional
in a system defined by territorial principles of source that is overinclusive of many kinds of income that can be commonly sourced
in other countries under different rules for the same kind of
income and that often have stronger non-territorial economic ties
in others. 76 Though benefit received is the primary justification for
source taxation, there is no way to measure it directly. 77 One can
only discover benefit by developing a tax base that reflects it.
72 Id. at 188. It is Vogel's view that the provision of government goods and
services by the Host is the only basis for taxing MNE income, thus affording to the
Host exclusive tax over the income. See Vogel, supra note 37.
73 Wilson & Wildasin, supra note 58, at 5 (describing marginal-cost pricing as
requiring a cost charged on the investment equal to the cost incurred by the
government in providing the public goods and services that benefit the
investment).
74 Joel Slemrod, Are Corporate Tax Rates, or Countries, Converging? at 4 (Univ.
of Mich. Office of Tax Policy Res., Working Paper No. 2001-12, 2001).
75 See William B. Barker, The Concept of Tax: A Normative Approach, in THE
CONCEPT OF TAX 35-37 (Bruno Peeters & William B. Barker, eds., forthcoming
2008).
76 See Barker, supra note 3 at 202 (discussing the problems with the present
approach to sourcing income in international taxation).
77 This is the difficulty with those who advocate broad source taxation of
business income for the United States under the justification of benefits received.
See Stephen E. Shay, et al., The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, "Mhat's Source Got to Do
With It?" Source Rules and U.S. InternationalTaxation, 56 N.Y.U. TAX. L. REV. 81, 154
(2002) (stating that source rules "lack a strong theoretical or prescriptive
content"). The benefit foreign business derives from a host is better measured by
source than by territorial connection with the income. See id. at 137-38 (arguing
that sources rules, while grounded in administrative efficiency, are arbitrary ways
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While benefit is the key to source taxation, the concept that
taxes should be charged only for the costs of providing public
inputs to foreign MNEs is also too narrow to capture the basic
factors influencing an MNE's locational decision and the
justification for source taxation. While public benefits and taxes
are relevant to an analysis of prospective costs associated with the
carrying on of the enterprise in the proposed location as factors in
the determination of profit, it would be very difficult for an MNE
to perform a cost/benefit analysis comparing the value of public
goods and services to speculative and varying tax liability. But
even if they could, MNEs are not there to earn government
benefits, especially if they pay full value through taxes. They are
there instead to make a larger profit than they could make
elsewhere. It is really the benefit received from a nation state in its
totality-that is, the benefit derived from its work force, its
infrastructure, and its resources and other natural amenities-that
make it possible to make a profit that is derived by the value
contributed by that particular country. That is the reason an MNE
locates in an emerging economy. It is this "profit" that has an
economic origin in the host that is the essence of economically
efficient and just source tax jurisdiction.
Moreover, the narrowly defined benefit theory that taxation is
exclusively the charge for public inputs provided to firms robs
developing economies of one of the most necessary ingredients for
development, that of obtaining sufficient revenue for the welfare of
the general populace.
The exchange theory of taxation, by
definition, requires a quid pro quo and rejects distributive values.
However, benefit to the firm broadly defined as the profit derived
from the firm's value in addition to exploitation of the host
country, is an economically sound base for taxing to provide for
the general welfare of the host, thus accomplishing distributional
justice.

of attributing income). In the case of income from capital, the benefit derived is
small. Though some small tax may be justified on the basis of benefit, that tax
ignores the large benefit that the home provides to the creation of the benefit. See
Barker, supra note 3 at 185-86, 195-97 (advocating a residence, rather than a
source, tax). Finally, even if a large nation with large consumer markets might be
able to get away with such tax exporting, ultimately it will be due to the fact that
those foreign businesses which stay will determine that it is profitable due to the
large economic rents they earn. Emerging economies do not have the economic
clout, however, to tax in this manner.
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5.2. Source and the Factors of Production
What attracts business is the key to understanding a nation's
appropriate source tax base. Reliance on a territorial basis can
produce illogical results and considerable conflict because income
production, especially in the case of capital, can have a plausible
physical connection with many different locations. There has
never been an accepted logical process for assigning income to a
geographical location. Moreover, source rules have been used to
promote different policies, including different goals in taxing
residents and nonresidents and, in the case of some countries
taxing source only, to cure some of the harm caused by lack of
resident tax. This has led to inconsistent rules for sourcing the
same income even in the same country. 78 If there were a superior
rule for determining geographic location, it should be based on a
clear and logical relation between the income and benefits derived
from the location. Since the physical location of mobile factors of
production have no necessary relation with benefit received by an
MNE from the host, the location of use of assets presents no
economic justification for taxation.
The fact that MNEs are more sensitive to tax regimes and
incentives reflects the fact that many of the factors of production
are quite mobile, and this leads to a wide range of potential
business locations. The effect of the mobility of many of the factors
of production on source taxation is demonstrated by looking at
monied capital. The clear trend in the world today is for source
countries to eliminate or reduce substantially their taxation of
interest income and oftentimes dividends. 79 In the case of Foreign
78 See Barker, supra note 3, at 202 (stating that source rules are often
inconsistent); see also INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION
42 (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 10, 1983) (noting that in the United States, the
single set of source rules is not entirely symmetrical for U.S.-source income and
foreign-source income), citing Comm'r for Inland Revenue v. Lever Bros., 1946
AD 441 (A) (S. Afr.); First Nat'l Bank of Southern Africa v. Comm'r for Inland
Revenue 2002(3) SA 375 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Millin v. Comm'r for Inland Revenue,
1928 AD 207 (A) (S. Afr.). The over reliance on source can easily create an over
extension of the source rules. In Apartheid South Africa, for example, the
principles of sourcing adopted by the courts included where the contract was
made, where funds were made available to the debtor, the residence of the debtor,
and the relevant factual matrix which focused on relevant business activities
These rules provide many different
rather than the specific transactions.
approaches to a finding of South African source. See generally South Africa, 5th
Report, supra note 21, §§ 1.3.3, 6.3.1.1 (discussing source taxation as a general rule
but residence taxation for passive income generated abroad, including royalties).
79 Barker, supra note 3, at 193-94.
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Portfolio Income ("FPI"),80 current evidence indicates that any tax
imposed by hosts is simply passed on to the debtor and is born by
the host economy. 8' In some cases, international lenders provide
loans only after payments of principle and interest are guaranteed
by the debtor free of taxes.8 2 This is even the case where the lender
is a resident of a country where the foreign tax would be passed on
83
to the resident government because of the foreign tax credit. It
reflects a fact of modem economic life that much of the world's FPI
is supplied by large institutional investors (like American pension
plans) that are exempt from tax in their own countries.
The Foreign Direct Investments ("FDI")84 of MNEs yields a
profit that includes a component that consists of the normal return
on the enterprise's capital. The taxation of the return on this
capital should be analogous to the return on FPI because it too is a
highly mobile factor of production. Studies have shown that
MNEs, to insure this outcome and the maximization of the benefits
of deferral, typically finance foreign operations predominantly
with debt; 85 one study has suggested that MNEs obtain as much as
80% of FDI from local borrowing especially in developing
economies.8 6
While nations have generally conceded the
80 FPI can be defined as all private, non-FDI investment made by nonresidents. Id. at 163.
81 For example, one study documents the substantial decline in interest rates
in Canada and a dramatic increase in foreign capital after withholding of tax on
interest earned by nonresidents was abolished. Donald S.J. Brean, International
Issues in Taxation: The CanadianPerspective 73 (Canadian Tax Paper No. 75, 1984);
see also Barker, supra note 3, at 201 (stating that economies strive for free trade and
enhanced factor mobility); VIo TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 144
(Brookings 1995) (arguing that top marginal tax rates on labor income should be
kept low to discourage talent from emigrating, which has a high social cost); M.B.
RAO, DOUBLE TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 113
(1983)(stating that withholding tax on entire amounts of income transferred
abroad shifts the tax burden to the debtor enterprise).
82 Charles R. Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income
Taxation at Source, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 292, 303 (1974).
83 But see Stephen E. Shay, et al., supra note 77, at 153 (recommending taxing
FPI on the basis of the benefit received by the investor).
84 FDI is foreign investment undertaken by an association, enterprise or
individual where the investor owns 10% or more of the equity in the activity
conducted. Barker, supra note 3, at 163, citing GARY C. HUFBAUER, UNITED STATES
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 63 n. 1 (Inst. For Int'l
Econ., 1992).
85 See Hines, supra note 28, at 400 (describing how MNEs have an incentive to
undercapitalize their foreign operations initially because they anticipate deferral).
86 See George F. Kopits, Effects of Tax Changes on Direct Investment Abroad, in
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impracticality of taxing FPI, many nations still hold to traditional
views of taxing the totality of business income.
Obviously, the objects of FDI present a more complex analysis
than the determination of the object of FPI. Unlike FPI where
income is derived solely from capital:
[Ilncome is derived internationally by businesses from
factor inputs including capital, tangible assets and
intangible assets. Income is also derived from the labor,
environment, infrastructure and public benefits of the
country in which the various activities are carried out.
Which country can be said to be the source of the income
based on the economic affinity of the income to the local?
Which country has the meritorious case to tax?... [Tihe
country that is the source of the assets that provides the
income-producing value should get the exclusive right to
tax. 87
The benefit derived by a host from the importation of capital in
all of its forms amply justifies exempting the normal return on this
capital, even if it were practical to tax. Capital transfers, even if
temporary, cause a redistribution of wealth from developed
88
countries' workers to emerging countries' workers.
Concomitantly, the host has provided the other factors of
production: labor, environment, infrastructure, public goods and
services, and, in many cases, local markets for the consumption of
the MNE's products. These values to the enterprise produce
income, which is economically related to the host. It follows that
this income does not have its economic origin in the home country
so that the host should have the exclusive rights of source taxation.
Where one exempts the normal return on capital provided by
the MNE, what one has left can be described as economic rents.
Economic rents of MNEs in the context of international operations
are of two kinds: locational rents and mobile rents.89 Locational
223, 241 (Robert Hellawell
ed., 1980) (providing numerical support for the idea that American multinational
companies vary their direct foreign investment depending on the U.S. treatment
of foreign-source corporate income), Peggy Musgrave, Commentary, id., 264
(supporting Kopits' conclusion that local borrowing accounts for almost 80% of
the financing of MNEs' FDI in developing countries).
87 Barker, supra note 3, at 202.
88 See SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 26.
89 See Harry Grubert, Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade and Electronic Commerce:
UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
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rents include net income arising from the factors of production
belonging to a host country. Mobile rents, on the other hand, are
those derived from mobile factors of production that can be
exploited in many different locations because the market for
consumption is worldwide. These mobile factors of production
that are imported by MNEs include money capital, tangible
property, and many intangible values including skilled labor.
The taxation of the normal return on monied capital used by a
foreign business enterprise by hosts is less significant due to the
prevalence of self-help borrowing practices utilized by MNEs.
There is, however-at least as a starting point before emerging
economies grant tax holidays, incentives and preferences-the
substantial potential for the taxation of the normal return from
tangible and intangible assets.
The appropriate source taxation of the income from intellectual
property, like patents, is one of the most controversial issues
between developed and emerging economies. 90 The position of the
developing world was articulated in the Manila Declaration, which
adopted the position that royalties should be treated as
distributions of profits where the parties were related, and thus
would not be deductible and would be subject to withholding. 91
The standard argument for a host's right to tax the royalty income
from patents is that the host is providing the environment and
protection for its utilization. 92 Where goods or services are
produced in the host for export for worldwide consumption,
however, the host's protection loses all practical importance.
Emerging economies here face the realities of tax competition:
nations will compete for this business -for the increased
employment, increased taxes, increased local consumption and
consumption taxes, and the externalities created by imported
technology and highly skilled labor. 93 Nations will tend to bid

Behavior Marginsand the Design of International Tax Systems 13-14 (CESifo Working
Paper, Paper No. 1366, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=645983
(distinguishing between locational rents and mobile rents' origins).
90 See RAO, supra note 38, at 116-21 (describing the U.N. Group discussions as
an example of the intellectual property taxation debate among nations).
91 Patrick, supra note 26, at 318-19.
92 See A.L.I., supra note 78, at 80 (arguing for sourcing the royalty income in
the country of use, since it is the host country's legal system that provides the
monopoly right that gives the patent its value).
93 Indeed, it has been suggested that increasing jobs may be more important
to developing economies than revenue to their Treasuries. Peggy B. Musgrave,
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down the tax on these mobile factors to zero. Moreover, this is a
rational strategy as long as the value of the benefits to the host
noted above (like increased employment) exceeds the costs to the
society, including the cost of providing public goods and services
at little or no income tax cost to the MNE. 94 The best strategy,
95
however, is not a forgone conclusion.
Even where assets are used by the MNE for production for
domestic consumption, the case for taxing the return on intangibles
is weak. Intangibles result from expenditures of capital that were
made in other countries that should receive, like monied capital, a
normal return free of host tax. Moreover, the nation under whose
tax laws the intangible was developed typically gives tax
incentives like expensing for the cost of research and development
that make the home nation the true joint venturer in the profit
making use of those assets, not the host. 96 Only successful
intangibles are exported to hosts (thus the country of development

Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation, Principles and Applications to the
European Union, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, (Sijbren
Cnossen. ed., 2000).
94 See Barker, supra note 3, at 184-88 (discussing factors to be considered in
making this decision in the context of application of intergovernmental versus
individual equity for different theories of taxation).
95 Emerging economies need to weigh many economic factors in assessing
the desirability of attracting business activity. For example, the economic impact
of the importation of the various forms of capital is different when viewed from
the perspective of current account balances. Where monied capital is imported
and converted into local currency, this creates a positive balance in the host's
current accounts which can be spent on capital exports or on the import of goods
and services. Capital spent on labor and purchasing goods and services in the
local economy is a stimulus to economic development.
Imports of tangible and intangible assets are rarely sold for local currency and
thus have no effect on the monetary supply. Foreign sales of locally-produced
products, though booked for accounting purposes to the MNE, unless converted
to local currency, will have no effect on the money supply and will not be
included as an export in current accounts. Where the profit from domestic sales is
repatriated by the MINE, this will be included as a capital export in current
accounts, thus requiring additional capital imports or goods and services exports
to balance the account. See generally Barker, supra note 3, at 175 (describing how
economic principles require an equilibrium of the import and export of goods and
services).
96 The fact that the MNE received a tax benefit in the home country for both
successful and unsuccessful intangibles is sometimes given as a reason for hosts to
tax. See Barker, supra note 3, at 202 (declaring the principle that income has a
locatable source as one that is taken for granted but the definition of the income's
source is not as well-defined). While it may not be unfair to the MNE to tax it, it
would be unfair to the home state.
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bears the tax loss from unsuccessful expenditures), and the host
does not contribute to their creation, just their utilization in host
consumption.97 After a fair return on the MNE's investment, the
income related to domestic consumption will be a locational
economic rent.
Finally, the value of some intangibles, like
trademarks, may be the product of activities and expenditures
carried out in the host jurisdiction, which does enhance its value.
This is not imported value, so the income generated does belong to
the host as locational economic rents.
This approach is consistent with the just allocation of the
income tax base among nations. The origin of the income is the
country that produced the value that gave rise to the income.98 In
the case of income from capital, that income is only the normal
return from the capital. In some cases, this income will belong to
the host where its economy produced the capital. This happens
where monied capital is obtained from residents of the host.
Tangible and intangible assets are normally imported by MNEs.
Thus, the normal return on these assets represents value created in
another country and does not have its economic origin in the host.
5.3. Source Rules and Economic Efficiency
Emerging economies must also examine proposed tax rules
under properly understood notions of economic efficiency. There
are two different theories of economic efficiency in the allocation of
capital: Capital Export Neutrality ("CEN") and Capital Import
Neutrality ("CIN"). 99 Though these do not specifically address
business income, a consideration of their approaches can help
illuminate the efficient conditions for business income. 100 Both
theories of economic efficiency assume general taxation of capital
income and source countries' legitimate power to tax the income
from capital provided by nonresidents. Both theories recognize
that it is the home countries' response that will determine whether
97 See Barker, supra note 3, at 207-08 (emphasizing the disproportionate
benefit reaped by the host country and the potential magnitude of the loss that the
home country can incur).
98 See generally id. at 202-12 (discussing whether the host or home country is
entitled to the income).
99 There is actually a third, National Neutrality ("NN"), that will not be
discussed herein. For a description of National Neutrality, see id. at 190
(identifying National Neutrality as a doctrine that allows both the home and host
country to tax capital).
100 For a full discussion of these concepts' use and misuse, see id. at 188-95.
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capital is efficiently allocated worldwide; they differ as to what
that response should be. CIN provides that "capital should be
taxed at the same rate as that imposed on domestic capital in the
capital-importing nation." 101 CIN's model of efficiency is that
capital should not be taxed in the home state; hence, the home
should provide an exemption for foreign source income. CEN
provides that "capital should be taxed at the same rate whether
utilized in the home country or in the host country." 102 CEN favors
worldwide resident taxation with a full tax credit for taxes paid to
the host. Emerging economies are strong advocates of CIN
because source taxation levels income by subsidizing capital
importing nations. CIN provides emerging nations a potentially
cheap source of capital. 103
Economists generally favor CEN because a nation that taxed
only domestic income from capital would experience a large
capital drain.10 4 Not surprisingly, developed countries in general
have followed the logic of CEN and have taxed residents on their
foreign source income from capital. Where effective, a CEN system
increases the cost of capital to emerging economies, but, because its
model of efficiency is pre-tax, it permits the host to tax it. These
regimes, however, are ineffective in many cases. On the one hand,
home countries have found that it is difficult to exercise effective
jurisdiction over the foreign source capital income of its residents
due to tax avoidance and evasion and because capital income is
often mixed with business income which is deferred or exempt.10 5
The effect of not effectively taxing residents' foreign source capital
income is to destroy the effectiveness of CEN and to create the
premise underlying CIN. On the other hand, by providing tax
incentives with or without exemption or tax sparing, the efficiency
of CIN is undermined where tax breaks are discriminatory and
create unfair competition for those who are without them. CIN's
premise is that capital will flow to the country where it garners the
highest return -that is, the country where it will be put to its most
productive use. CIN, however, is post-tax. The highest return is
101Id. at 189.
102

Id.

See Schmidt, supra note 11, at 34.
See Barker, supra note 3, at 190-91 (arguing that CEN is a superior doctrine
because it encourages an efficient allocation of world investment).
105 See id. at 165-69 (tracking the historical shift in countries' tax bases from
capital and business income to labor and consumption).
103
104
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either tax-free, or any tax must be added on to the rate. Thus,
source countries are more and more unlikely to tax nonresidents'
capital income for very good reasons. Taxation either will stymie
the import of capital or will be ineffective because it will be passed
onto the borrower and the host economy. These practicalities help
illustrate a basic truth in terms of two theories of justice in taxation:
benefit and ability to pay. Hosts cannot tax the normal return from
capital because it benefits little from the host's environment. 106
Hosts, in addition, cannot tax the normal income from capital
according to the principle of ability to pay because ability to pay is
an attribute of residence and source countries lack both sufficient
justification and the practical power to tax.
CIN, therefore, is non-neutral because the tax will be added
onto the cost of borrowing and will increase the debtor's costs.
CIN is inefficient because tax affects the locational decision and the
only way to create conditions of efficiency is for no country to tax
or for all countries to tax at the same rate. The failure of CIN is in
its paradigm, which assumes that the relevant competitive
environment or level playing field within which a nonresident
competes is a single country.
The notion of fair competition within a country ignores the
reality of open capital markets, freer trade, and freer factor
mobility. This not only affects FPI, but FDI as well. MNEs have
choices. Their playing field can be several countries or a region in
a zone of free trade. More and more, the choices for production of
goods and the provision of services are becoming worldwide. In
the case of financial services, for example, it is already there. Thus,
CIN's conditions of efficiency promote tax competition, inexorably
driving the rate for source taxation of a normal return from capital
to zero. 107
The concept of CIN and a single nation level playing field can
106 See id. at 195-97 (describing CIN as justifying source-based taxation, given
the minimal benefit the host country provides the taxpayer).
107 There are some risks to exemption for non-residents' capital income.
Nontaxation of nonresident capital income can also be potentially harmful to the
host. The domestic economy of the host is exposed to a risk that untaxed foreign
capital will be lent at a rate below the pretax return on taxed domestic capital.
The cure, of course, is full taxation by the home country, but this is not within the
control of the host. The host may conclude that the trade-offs are acceptable
because cheaper capital benefits domestic borrowers and economic productivity
in general. Should hosts wish to prevent this from happening, the solution is to
tax nonresident capital income, which will increase the cost to its borrowers
and/or decrease the supply.
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be a useful paradigm for the taxation of locational economic rents,
however. Though MNEs' playing fields are truly global and the
competition is for world markets, each chooses a location to earn
rents. These rents are the product of non-mobile factors of
production and an MNE's ability to maximize the return on capital
in that location.
From the perspective of developing economies whose
objectives are the dual goals of encouraging foreign investment
and taxing that investment, taxing economic rents is economically
neutral because "[b]y definition, taxes on rents secure revenues for
108
public purposes without disturbing private economic decisions."
A tax on rents should be a successful tax because by their nature
MNEs should have some firm specific assets that make it possible
for them to exploit the values found in developing economies in a
more efficient way than domestic companies that would otherwise
have a natural advantage. 109 An additional consideration is that a
tax on economic rents represents a sharing of the risk between the
MNE and the host government since only successful enterprises
are taxed, and the host shares the risk by receiving no tax on the
margin on new investment. Therefore, not only does the tax on
economic rents encourage new investment in a non-distorting
manner, but it is ideal from the point of view of developing
economies trying to increase the welfare of their citizens by taxes
whose burden falls on nonresident firms. 110
This does not mean that competition among nations
disappears. However, due to the natural differences in the
endowments of emerging economies, tax differentials on economic
rents, which will be spent on public inputs that directly enhance
the business environment and public welfare measures that
indirectly enhance the business environment, will lose much of
their importance. Ultimately, just knowing what tax base clearly

108 Slemrod, supra note 74, at 4.
109 See Richard Bird, The InterjurisdictionalAllocation of Income, 3 AUSTRALIAN

TAX F. 333-54 (1986) (emphasizing that that the firm's assets themselves produce
economic rents); see also Peter B. Sorensen, Changing Views of the CorporateIncome
Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J.279, 290 (1995) (arguing that sometimes the "local factors" of a
country enable multinational companies to earn higher than normal rents on
investments).
My point develops their analysis by suggesting that these
advantages make it possible to more efficiently exploit the location, thus earning
additional rents.
110 See Slemrod, supra note 74, at 6-7 (discussing tax on foreign-owned rents).
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belongs to the source country will encourage emerging economies
to exercise their tax jurisdiction.
Knowledge of the economic origin of income not only provides
the clearest indication of which nation has a right and interest in
taxation, but it also can indicate the weakness of a nation's claim to
taxation where the territorial basis lacks an economic justification.
The simple truth for emerging economies is that even where
income can be sourced within their jurisdictions under traditional
approaches to source jurisdiction, a so-called tax incentive that
would relinquish their tax over income that does not have a
sufficient economic connection with the host, instead of being a
sacrifice, is instead in the direction of just tax policy. It is not
presently, however, a rational policy. The tax incentives, tax
holidays and tax preferences commonly adopted by emerging
economies today are inefficient in accomplishing their goals, and
are discriminatory and cause harm to the resident taxpayers thus
putting pressure on hosts to grant similar tax benefits to residents.
To the contrary, the incentive system proposed herein is not like
the generality of the incentives offered which are targeted,
discriminatory tax breaks for a few, but instead are general
exemptions from taxation that would be neutral as to investment
and business activities and are the most economically efficient
under current conditions. The common advice of the developed
world to the emerging world is to refrain from discriminatory tax
incentives, and to entice MNEs instead with low rates of tax
applied to both nonresidents and residents alike."l The more
optimal strategy suggested herein that accomplishes a similar
neutrality is to reconstitute the tax base by eliminating targeted
preferences and redefining business income. This reduces the tax
base with regard to income from capital, but increases the tax base
with regard to non-capital business income.
This strategy
recognizes an appropriate tax base for emerging economies with a
realistic power to impose a significant burden.

111 See CORPORATE TAX INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note
1, at 26-27 (discouraging generally the use of special tax incentives and
encouraging a reduced statutory corporate income tax rate); see also
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 52, at 10 (describing a reform measure
that sets the rate for corporate income tax equal to that of the top marginal
personal income tax rate and allows only minimal tax incentives).
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5.4. A Consumption Tax Model of Source Taxationfor Emerging
Economies
Economic rents are the profits left over after the normal return
on capital is isolated. 112 An income tax on economic rents is
equivalent to a business expenditure or consumption or cash flow
tax." 3 The critical components of such under an income tax
approach would be an allowance for economic depreciation and an
imputed interest deduction for the normal rate of return on all
capital. Under a consumption or expenditure tax model instead,
the tax base permits deductions for all expenditures for goods and
services, both current and capital. This kind of cash flow tax
would be a much simpler model than an income tax on economic
rents.114
A business expenditure tax taxes what is available for
consumption over and above capital and its normal return. On
account of this, a tax on economic rents ignores the income tax
problem of the bias toward present consumption, treating present
consumption and greater future consumption as equal where the
present discounted value of future consumption is the same as
present consumption. It accomplishes this by ignoring interest.
This is a significant advantage due to the distortion caused by

112 The emphasis herein on exclusive source taxation of economic rents
distinguishes this proposal from the international consensus as described by
Reuven Avi-Yonah, which proposes the source taxation of active business income
and the residence-based taxation of portfolio income. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 3,
at 1305. That is because when one isolates the economic rent component of
income, the result is the allocation to the resident country of the tax on the normal
return on all capital, not just the foreign portfolio income component.
113 See Barker, supra note 3, at 212 (explaining that after one removes the
normal return of capital from the tax base, the remaining portion is consumption).
114 Were home countries not to adopt the solution of exempting foreign
source economic rents, which is discussed in Section 7, the issue arises as to
whether such a tax is an income tax creditable against home country income tax.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901 (2000) (setting forth various restrictions on the foreign tax
credit provided by the United States). Since a tax on economic rents is clearly a
tax on an amount that constitutes income, the answer should be a categorical yes.
Though authority for this proposition is sparse, the United States does allow a
partial credit for the IRAP, the Italian general consumption tax on small and
medium-sized businesses. News Release, IRS, IRS News Release IR-INT-98-6
(Mar. 31, 1998). Since the IRAP does not allow a deduction for labor and interest,
it reduces the credit by the proportion of the base that represents un-deducted
interest and taxes. Under the consumption tax model proposed herein, labor costs
are deductible and interest costs can be deducted under the R&F, as opposed to
the R system. See infra note 115 (discussing the R and R&F systems).
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deductions for the inflation component of interest in income tax
systems. 115
In addition, if earnings and profits are defined in terms of
economic rents (less taxes), then dividend distributions are
distributions of rents, not income from capital. Emerging nations
that wish to encourage continued use of these funds in their
countries could contemplate a two-tiered system: a tax on the rents
at the corporate level, and a second tax imposed upon the
distribution of rent to the shareholders.
6.

HOME COUNTRY RESPONSE

Traditional doctrine recognizes that home countries, though
not the source of the economic activities that gave rise to the
income, have an independent basis for taxing the revenue, and that
is residence.
The demonstration of the economic origin of
economic rents in the host necessarily demonstrates that it is not in
the home and that the home lacks any economic claim to tax the
income in rem. The tax claim of residence, however, is supported
by the taxpayer's relation to the country, an in personam principle.
The international tax model proposed here, however, has
blurred the traditional conflict between source- and residencebased taxation by rewriting the rules for sourcing income based on
concepts of economic origin. The concept of economic origin
represents a holistic approach to sourcing income that weighs the
importance of territory and residence, in rem and in personam
jurisdiction, to determine the most important economic ties. This is
a value-laden approach that assesses right, might, and justice.
Business income is divided into economic rents which are sourced
in the host, hence territorial jurisdiction, and the return from
capital which is sourced in the home jurisdiction, hence personal
115 See Barker, supra note 3, at 213 (arguing that an advantage of the
consumption tax is that the inflows and outflows of debt or equity and their
returns are treated equally); see also J.E. MEADE, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF
DIRECT TAXATION 230-33 (1978) (describing the effects of R-base and R&F base
consumption taxes). An R-base consumption tax accomplishes this directly by
denying a deduction for interest. Were a deduction for interest necessary to make
a consumption tax look more like an income tax for foreign tax credit purposes of
home countries, the host could adopt an R&F base tax which changes the
treatment of loans, including borrowings, as income and treats principal and
interest repayments as deductions. Id. at 233. An alternative design based more
closely on income tax principles would allow a deduction for interest for the real
component of interest to the MNE. The MNE would also be entitled to deduct
economic depreciation of assets plus set up a reserve for replacement cost.
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jurisdiction. In this model, residence becomes a primary, not a
secondary, right to tax. Where the claims of residence are included
in the sourcing determination, can residence still be an
independent basis for taxation?
The premise of worldwide
taxation is that a nation has the right to tax the total income of its
own people because of the special obligations and duties between
them. Principles of equality among a nation's taxpayers suggest
that all pay taxes on the basis of their ability to pay.
Inter-nation conflict, however, requires nations to make
concessions to the principles of ability to pay. Exemption countries
suspend the principle for active business income. Foreign tax
credit regimes suspend the principle when they adopt
comprehensive deferral and exemption systems for foreign
"source" income. The result may be that only the MNE benefits
because the host taxes lightly or not at all. In light of the
magnitude of the present concessions made, should the principles
of ability to pay require the home country to tax the value that the
emerging nation has added to the world? If so, is this not poaching
on the tax base of the developing world?
Moreover, taxation in accordance with ability to pay is poorly
applied to corporate enterprises.1 6 A principle reason for the
taxation of worldwide income is the importance of progressive tax
Progressive principles rarely apply to MNEs. 117
principles.
Corporations at best are temporary surrogate taxpayers for their
owners.
At worst, they are independent persons without
boundaries or true national affiliation. The benefit derived by
MNEs from countries in which they operate is still the best basis
for taxing corporations, and the justice of taxation in accordance
with benefit clearly belongs to the host in the case of locational
economic rents. Moreover, these rents are derived from value
contributed by the host to the taxpayer. The home still benefits,
however. These rents eventually make their way home and add to
the store of the home country's wealth. They are paid as dividends
116 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA.
TAx REV. 299, 318-23 (2001) (arguing that the ability-to-pay principle should not
be applied to foreign-source income of U.S. corporations because of challenges in
defining the corporation's residence and the possibility of U.S. residents
purchasing portfolio investments in order to take advantage of benefits that were
intended for corporations).
117 For a limited exception for low-income corporations from the principle of
flat rate taxation, see I.R.C. § 11 (2000).
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and resident shareholders will pay tax on them as dividends or
capital gain on the sale of their shares. While the corporate tax
base would not be shared with the home with respect to foreign
sourced economic rents, this tax base is shared with the home
through the taxation of individuals. This should be a fitting
compromise in a world with conflicting claims to revenue.
If fairness to developing economies were not sufficient
justification, there are other compelling reasons why home
countries should be willing to relinquish tax on foreign economic
rents. The home has a strong interest in its foreign ventures being
competitive; that is why home states often use tax incentives to
promote these activities. Relinquishing tax on foreign source
economic rents can help home businesses compete with other
countries' MNEs which operate on a worldwide playing field
dominated by free capital movement and businesses seeking rents
where much of business income is exempt from home country
tax. 11 8 This model acknowledges the real world in which we live.
This proposal is compatible with the Report of the President's
Panel on Federal Tax Reform" 9 that recommended that the United
States adopt a territorial tax system for business income earned by
United States residents. 120 The Panel recommended that both
active business income earned by foreign affiliates abroad and
dividends paid out of active foreign business income would be
exempt.' 2 ' The proposal provides that interest and royalties
deducted in the host country would not be exempt, nor would
income generated by foreign assets like financial income.1 22
Home countries may also consider the aspects of justice toward

118 See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities:
CorporateTax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 937, 938, 950 n.22, 957 (2004)
(concluding that were the United States to exempt foreign source income (other
than passive income) of corporations, both world and American welfare would be
advanced).
The proposal herein provides the methodology for accurately
accomplishing this outcome.
119

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND

PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM (2005), available at
http://taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/.
120 Id. at 62.
121 Id. at 134.
122 Id. Though one cannot be sure from the description of the plan, the
Panel's proposal could be implemented by taxing worldwide income with an
exclusion for foreign economic rents. The result would be, however, that the
entire return on capital would be taxable in the United States, not just the return
that was deducted in the host state.
PRO-GROWTH:
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the developing world. Where developed countries wish to foster
development in emerging economies, it would greatly benefit these
countries to give them control over this tax base. Freedom from
the entanglement of foreign tax systems would free them to
achieve social and economic policies unfettered by the tax
consequences of these policies in the home states of foreign
investors. Indeed, MNEs may find that hosts, now assured of the
soundness of their tax base, may exercise their rights to tax for the
public good providing both infrastructure development of benefit
to MNEs and accomplishing redistributive goals.
This is also a pragmatic solution because it substantially
benefits home countries. The basic premise of residence-based
taxation is that residence defers to source, and home countries are
only entitled to the residual tax. Even though few countries tax the
investment income of foreign residents, resident countries' tax
systems face incredible difficulties in capturing this base. Even
where the income is reported, home countries may only get a
portion of the tax. The territorial understanding of source has
sourced the normal return on capital in all of its forms outside the
country of residence, typically in the country of use.1 23 Where
income is from a foreign source, there is a likelihood that it will be
exempt or shielded by foreign tax credits in the resident state even
where the host imposes little or no tax. Residence taxation with
deferral and foreign tax credits produce little revenue, as has been
documented in the case of the United States, where recent findings
show that the tax on repatriated earnings of MNEs is
approximately 3.3%.124 Much of this is the result of many
taxpayers being in excess credit positions. Indeed, this results in
the developing economies subsidizing the developed economies'
higher source rates on business income and increases the pressure
on them by international business to reduce their effective tax rates
by providing tax holidays, incentives, and preferences.
The
solution proposed herein presents a fair trade; under these
123 See Barker, supra note 3, at 203 (arguing that the best territorial source of
interest income rule is the place of use). In some cases, surrogate principles like
the residence of the debtor are assumed to accurately identify the place of use. Id.
at 204. Many of the sourcing rules in pre-apartheid South Africa were designed to
circumvent the limitation of territorial taxation. See Fifth Report, supra note 21,
paras. 1.3.3. & 2.1. (describing the growth of source provisions in South Africa's
tax system). Royalty income, for example, is sourced in the country of the owner's
residence.
124 Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 20, at 798.
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proposed allocation rules, home nations are allocated the full tax
on residents' capital income in exchange for the tax on foreign
locational economic rents.
Though according the exclusive right to tax the normal return
on capital to the country of residence does reflect a growing
consensus in theory and practice in the developed world, its
implementation has been primarily through treaties for the
elimination of double taxation. While this paper has argued that
this is good tax policy for emerging economies, emerging
economies may hesitate to relinquish this tax base without
obtaining concessions. A realistic prospect of implementation may
require the adoption of bilateral treaties which will be highly
advantageous to both countries and taxpayers alike. More tax
treaties with emerging economies would certainly be in the best
interest of countries such as the United States, which have had
trouble negotiating treaties with emerging economies due to its
refusal to grant concessions like tax sparing. 25 Exemption of
economic rents might encourage developing economies to enter
into treaties with countries like the United States that could
provide access to information that would make taxation of foreign
derived capital income more effective. Moreover, the solution to
give up what it neither has nor really deserves in exchange for a
tax base it does deserve and can effectively capture, would clearly
be an ideal solution to fostering development in emerging
economies and curbing the harmful effects of tax competition both
at home and abroad.
7.

CONCLUSION

Sustained world development will only be achieved by
recognizing the facts of government tax competition, among both
emerging and developed economies. International tax regimes and
tax competition also affect the competition between different
nations' transnational enterprises. Progress can be achieved by
establishing non-antagonistic, economically effective source and
residence country taxation.
Economic evidence strongly supports the conclusion that tax
incentives do not lead to the type of long-term foreign business
presence in developing economies that promotes significant
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Some countries will not enter treaties without tax sparing.
supra note 1, at 19-20.
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economic improvement.
Recent evidence does support the
finding, however, that tax sparing does lead to increased foreign
direct investment in tax sparing treaty partners. It provides a
powerful incentive for MNEs to invest in particular emerging
economies because the tax savings end up as larger profits for
MNEs. Evidence is lacking, however, regarding whether tax
incentives with or without exemption or tax sparing result in
significant development in emerging economies. The bulk of the
evidence, however, indicates that incentives are harmful because
they are inefficient, distorting, and encourage the repatriation of
dividends by MNEs. Tax sparing, in fact, exacerbates the problem
by encouraging emerging economies to grant even more tax
concessions to MNEs.126 Thus, tax sparing as it presently exists
seems no more than state subsidies by developed countries of their
own enterprises and a stimulus to harmful tax competition by
developing countries.
There is, however, a workable strategy for both developing and
developed economies that will encourage foreign direct investment
in emerging economies, while at the same time reduce the wasteful
consequences of tax competition. Emerging economies should
abandon the source taxation of the normal return from capital of
foreign persons. This would promote economically efficient tax
relief for foreign business.
What is left for source countries is the taxation of economic
rents. The importance of increased tax revenues to developing
economies indicates that they should tax these rents. The proposal
suggests that they could benefit by a two-stage tax, one on
corporate rents and a second on a distribution of these rents to
shareholders. This would encourage MNEs to retain their profit in
the developing economy. They should refrain from taxing any
other income of nonresident MNEs unless their intent is to
discourage their presence.
This proposal does not eliminate tax competition; it simply
restructures it in accordance with sounder principles with less
harmful effects. The abandonment of territorial jurisdiction over
the normal return from capital, which emerging economies have
neither the might nor the right to do, will create neutrality among
source countries vis-A-vis capital flows.
Due to the natural
126 Cf. Hines, supra note 62, at 28 (concluding that Japanese firms are taxed at
lower rates than American firms in countries with which Japan has tax sparing
agreements).
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differences in country endowments, tax differences (which, if
wisely spent, will increase the attractiveness of emerging
economies) will lose much of their importance.
Ultimately,
emerging economies assured of power over this tax base may
decide to use it.
Developed countries should exempt or adopt tax sparing for
locational rents. This is not foreign aid, but is instead a recognition
that the public purpose that supports worldwide taxation of
residents is weak in the case of MNEs and should give way to a
more important purpose of recognizing the justice of developing
countries' exclusive entitlement to this tax base. Control over this
tax base would provide emerging economies choices concerning
their own development.
Though this strategy for unilateral action produces immediate
and substantial gains for both developed and emerging economies,
countries may only be willing to concede their historic tax base
through bilateral tax treaties. Tax treaties present a superior
method for international tax claim adjustments because they
provide a stable and attractive environment for MNEs, they can
reduce the pressure of tax competition of emerging economies,
they can provide needed tax information to both countries, and
they provide substantial non-tax externalities. This would be a
win-win result indeed.

